Law Quadrangle (formerly Law Quad Notes)
Volume 47

Number 3

Article 8

Winter 2005

Confrontation After Crawford
Richard D. Friedman
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/lqnotes

Recommended Citation
Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation After Crawford, 47 Law Quadrangle (formerly Law Quad Notes) (2005).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/lqnotes/vol47/iss3/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Quadrangle (formerly Law Quad Notes) by an authorized
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

Thcjollo11 ing c,lite,I C\Cerpt, dro11 nji-om "The Conji-ontarion
Clcm,c Re-Rooted and 7im1·Jormed."l003-0-/. Cato Supreme Court
Re,·ie,1· -1-39 (200-1-). l)J Lem School Proji·ssor Rich<1rd D. Friedman,

discusses the impacr, ~ffi:cr,. and </UCl'tions gene roted /~1- the U.S. Supreme

mmter hall' reliable a court mc~1 deem it to be, unless the <1ccuscd hos
had an adequare opporrnnity
1'/C/femcnt."

10

cross-c.rnmine the 1ritncss ,rho made the

"ll'herc nontcstimonial heanay is ar issue. it is ll'ho/0· consistent

Court'., rulinq in Cra1dc1rd 1·. \Vashin~ton lost re<1r that a defendant

11 ith the Fromers' design co afford the statesflexibility in their derelop-

is cnt itlcd to conji-ont CIIJ(I cross-e.rnmine

mcm oj' hearrny lmr

l

._

_,,

Cit'.)·

':/

testimonial st<11cmcnt

prc;cntcd again.ff him. In Cra1dord, the d~ji:ndanr, charged 11·i1h
arracking another man 11'ith a kniji:. contc.,ccd the trial cow·t 's admiiiion

as docs Roher ts /Roberts

I'.

Ohio, -/.-/.S U.S.

.>6 ( 1980)/. an,/ as 1rould an opproac/1 chm cxempce,I such slatcments
_ji-om Conji-onwcion Clm1sc scrutiny alcogether,"jt1scice .·lntonin Scalia

oj'a tape-recorded statcmem his 11'!/c made to police ll'ithom gi1·ing him

11 rote for the Co1m in Cra11·forcl. "ll'here testimonial eridence is at isst1e,

the opportt1nity

holl'c1-cr, the Sixth. lmendmem demands ll'hat chc common !all' reqt1ired:

10

cross-e:wmine. The 1rial cot1rr admiued the statemenr,

unarnilability an,/ a prior opportunitJ.Jor cross-e.rnmination. lie lem·c

an,/ 1he appeals courr upheld the conricrion.
II hen Cr.111·ford 11m C11gucd before the U.S. Supreme Courr in
.\·01 ember

.ZOO]. the gt1iding principle.for mo decades had been thar

"the U.S. Supreme Court hos tolerated admission of om-ofcourr swtements a9ains1 chc accused, ll'ithout cross-c.rnminalion,

if the statements

arc deemed 'reliable' or 'trust11-orthJ."'acconling co Friedman. But in

jar another daJ a1~r effort
'te,limonia/."'

10

spell out a comprehcnsiFe definition of

"Cr.111·ford is not ontr a rindication oft he rig hes C?f the acwscd. bur
a 1·iccory.Jor_jidclicJ

10

constitlllional text all(/ intent ,"Friedman 11-rircs

in the arricle.Ji·om ll'hich this excerpt is taken. ".fod yec the decision

Cr.111-ford, ·'the S11prcmc Cot1rt did a sharp ahom~Jace. holding char

/cares many open q11csrions. and all la11yers inroh-ed in the cnminal

a 'tesmnonia/' scarcmcnt cannol be admitted against an acrnscd, no

justice process ll'i!l hare to adjust to the nell' regime that it creates."

80

I LQN

Winter 2005

By Richard D. Friedman
Cranford reflects a paradigm shift in the doctrine of the
Confrontation Clause. Nonetheless, Cranford and amici went to
some pains to assure the Supreme Court that adoption of the
testimonial approach would alter the results in few if anv of the
Court's own precedents. A considerable number of deci~ions in
the lower courts, howc\·er, would come out differentlv under
Cranford . To set the groundwork for understanding ho~v Cranford
alters the doctrinal landscape and the important issues that are
likely to arise, it will first help to examine several respects in
which Cranford does not change the law.
First , under Cranford, as before, a statement does not raise
a confrontation issue unless it is offered to pro\'C the truth of
a matter that it asserts. This is the rule of Tennessee ,,. Street (4 71
U.S. 409,414 (1985)], which Crmiford explicitly reaffirms.
In Street itself, for example, the defendant contended that the
police coerced him to make a statement similar to that of an
accomplice's confession. The Court ruled unanimouslv that the
prosecution therefore could introduce the accomplic:'s confession
to demonstrate not that it was true but that it was substantiallv
different from the defendant's . That result would be unchanged
under Cra,iford. There may be questions as to how far a prosecutor
may take this " not for the truth" argument . For example, if the
prosecutor argues that the statement is being offered as support
for the opinion of an expert witness, in some cases that might
be considered too thin a Yenecr. Nonetheless, the basic doctrine
remains in place.
Second, many statements that were admissible under Roberts
will still be admissible under Cra,iford, though the grounds of
decision will be different. The question is not, as some analysts
haYe posed it, whether Cranford preserves given hearsay excep tions. The rule against hearsay and the Confrontation Clause are
separate sources of law
and Cra,iford stops the tendency to
meld them. The question for Confrontation Clause purposes in
each case is whether the given statement is testimonial. The fact
that a statement fits within a hearsay exception does not alter its
status with respect to that question.
But one can say that most statements that fit within certain
hearsay exceptions are not testimonial. For example, under
Roberts, business records and conspirator statements were deemed
reliable because they fell within "firmly rooted" hearsay exemptions. Under Cra,iford, almost all such statements will be considered non-testimonial, and therefore the Confrontation Clause will
impose little, if any, obstacle to their admissibilitv.
Third, the rule of California v. Green (399 U.S~ 149 (1970))
also is preserved. As the Cra1iford Court summarized the rule,
"[W]hen the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the
Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his
prior testimonial statements."
In my view, the rule is a dubious one. It fails to take into
account the serious impairment of the abilitv to cross-examine
that arises when a witness' prior statement /s admitted and the
witness does not re-assert its substance, effectively walking away
from it. But the Court has shown no inclination to modifv the
rule. Indeed, it was reinforced by Justice Scalia himself i; United

States v. Owens (484 U.S. 554 ( 1988)], a case inrnlving a witness
whose se\·cre head injuries destroyed much of his memory - and
it now becomes more important than ever for prosecutors. If a
witness makes a statement favorable to a prosecutor, but the prosecutor is afraid that the witness will not stand bv the statement
at trial, the prosecutor should not argue that th; statement is
"reliable." Rather, the prosecutor should bring the witness to
trial, or otherwise ensure that the defendant has had an adequate
opportunity for cross. If the witness reaffirms the substance of
the prior statement, all is well and good for the prosecutor. If she
testifies at variance from the statement, then the Confrontation
Clause does not bar admissibility of the statement.
Fourth, in applying Roberts, the Court developed a body
of case la\Y concerning what constitutes proof of unavailability
(assuming the given statement can be introduced onlv if the
declarant is unarnilable), and that case law - includi~g part
of Roberts itself - is left untouched, for better or worse. At
argument in Crmiford, the chief justice asked what impact the
testimonial approach would have on Mancusi,,_ Stubbs (408 U.S.
204 (1972)], a key case in this line and one in which he wrote the
majority opinion. The proper answer is simple: None at all.
Fifth, Cranford explicitly presen·cs the principle that the
accused should be deemed to have forfeited the confrontation
right if the accused's own misconduct prevented him from having
an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness . The right
may be forfeited, for example, if the accused murdered or intimidated the witness. The forfeiture principle may take on greater
importance under Cra,iford, as explained below.
Sixth, the rule of Maryland,,_ Craig (497 U.S. 836 (1990)] is
unchanged, at least for now. In that case, the Court held that,
upon a particularized showing that a child witness would be
traumatized by testifying in the presence of the accused, the child
may testify in another room, with the judge and counsel present
but the jury and the accused connected electronically. Crmiford
addresses the question of when confrontation is required; Craig
addresses the question of what procedures confrontation requires.
The two cases can coexist peacefully, and nothing in Cranford
suggests that Craig is placed in doubt . And yet, Justice Scalia
dissented bitterly in Craig. The categorical nature of his opinion
in Crmiford squares better with his Craig dissent than with Justice
O'Connor's looser majority opinion in Craig, and presumably he
would welcome the opportunity to O\'Crrulc Craig. Whether he
would haYe the \'Otes is an open question.
Finally, Craeford leaves intact the final succor of prosecutors, the rule that a violation of the confrontation right may be
harmless and therefore not require reversal.
1

Changes and open questions
That Craeford leaves much of the status quo ante unchanged
does not gainsay that it changes a great deal, and not just the
conceptual framework of the Confrontation Clause . Here I will
address respects in which Cranford does change the law, questions
that it leaves open, and adjustments to existing law that might be
adopted in its wake.
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A. The basic change
Most fundamentally, of course, Cranford ends the prosecutorial use of testimonial statements made to police in circumstances
where the accused cannot confront his accuser. That means that
when a prosecutor attempts to introduce a testimonial statement
made by a person " ·ho is not a witness at trial, the prosecutor
will not be able to argue that the statement should be admitted
because it is reliable. Unless the accused either has had the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, or has forfeited the right to
confront her, the statement cannot be admitted.
Thus, to take an obYious example, some courts have been
willing to admit grand jury testimony given by a witness who is
not available at trial, persuading thcmseh·es that nrious factors
- including the fact that the testimony was giYen under oath
- are in the aggregate sufficiently strong "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" to excuse the absence of an opportunity
for cross -examination. Cranford means that this practice must
stop. Similarly, station-house statements, of the type invoh-ed in
Cranford itself, and statements made in plea hearings may not be
introduced by the prosecution unless either the witness testifies at
trial or she is unavailable and the accused has had an opportunity
to cross-examine her. Courts have already begun to apply cases
consistently" with these principles . In one Detroit murder case
pending on appeal when Cranford was decided, the prosecutor has
since confessed error, because the conviction depended in part
on statements made to a polygraph examiner by a friend of the
accused. Consider also United States r. Saner [313 F. Supp. 2d 896
(S .D. Ind. 2004)], a post-Cranford decision in which the accused,
a bookstore manager, objected to admission of a statement by a
competitor, made to a Justice Department lawyer and paralegal,
that the two managers had fixed prices. The Court held, properly,
that because the accused had not had a chance to cross-examine
the competitor, who asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege
at trial, Cranford precluded admissibility of the competitor's
statement.

B. The meaning of "testimonial"
The most significant question that arises, of course, is how far
the category of"testimonial" statements extends.

1. Standards
The Craiford Court did not have difficulty in concluding that
Sylvia's [the defendant's spouse's] statement was testimonial:
"Statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations," as Sylvia's was, are "testimonial under even a narrow
standard." As the Court elaborated:
"Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to
prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury,
or at a former trial; and to police interrogations. These are the
modern practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the
Confrontation Clause was directed ."
So much for the core. The boundaries of the category will
have to be marked out by future cases. The Court quoted three
standards without choosing among them:
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• "Ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent
that
is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior
testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or
similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably
expect to be used prosecutorially";
• "Extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony,
or confessions"; and

• "Statements that were made under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be a,·ailable for use at a later trial."
I believe the third of these is the most useful and accurate .
It captures the animating idea behind the Confrontation Clause

the prevention of a system in which witnesses can offer their
testimony in priYate without cross-examination. In some cases,
under this view, a statement should be considered testimonial
even though it was not made to a goyernment official.
It is by no means certain that this standard will ultimately
pre,·ail. Some language in Cranford emphasizes the role of government officers in creating testimony. For example, having used
the term "interrogation," the Court takes care to note that
Syh·ia's statement, "knowingly given in response to structured
police questioning, qualifies under any conceiYablc definition"; at
another point, it noted that "[i]nrnlvement of government officers
in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial presents
unique potential for prosecutorial abuse." This emphasis on
gm·ernment involvement might suggest that the Court will stick
closely to a minimalist definition of testimonial statements.
That would be a mistake, however. I do not believe that
participation by go,·ernmcnt officials in creation of the statement
- either receipt of it as its initial audience or active procurement of it through interrogation - is the essence of what makes a
statement testimonial.
The confrontation right was recognized in older systems
in which there was no public prosecutor, and victims or their
families prosecuted crimes themselves. The idea behind the
confrontation right is that the judicial system cannot try an
accused with the aid of testimony by a witness whom the accused
has not had a chance to confront. The prosecutor plays no essential
role in the violation.
Thus, if just before trial a person shoved a written statement
under the courthouse door, asserting that the accused did in fact
commit the crime, that would plainly be testimonial even though
no gm·crnment official played a role in preparing the statement.
One ground for hope in this respect is that Cranford itself noted
that one of the statements inrnh·cd in the notorious Ralei9h case
was a letter.
In some cases a problem that nearly is the reverse arises - an
investigath·e official may be seeking to procure evidence, but
the declarant may not understand this. I believe that in the usual
case the investigator's anticipation should not alter characterization of the statement. If the declarant docs not recognize she is
creating c,·idcnce that may be used in a criminal proceeding, then
the nature of what she is doing in making the statement is not
testimonial.

Thus, a conYersation between criminal confederates, with no
anticipation of a leak to the authorities, is not ordinarily testimonial, and if in fact the authorities arc surreptitiously recording
the conversation, that should not change the result. On the other
hand, investigators probably should not be allowed to disguise
their intent gratuitously - that is, for the purpose of defeating
the confrontation right. Accordingly, eYen apart from a standard

Consider, for example, State "· Davis (64 P.3d 661 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2003)], now on review in the Washington Supreme Court
(the same court from which Crmiford came). The complainant
called 911 and, in response to questions by the operator, disclosed
that the defendant had beaten her with his fists and then run out
the door, further disclosed that she had a protection order against
him, and explained the reasons why he had been in her house. The

like the third one quoted above, perhaps a statement should

complainant did not testify at trial, and the 911 tape was played to

be considered testimonial in what might be called an "invited
statement" context in which the statement fits a description such
as this:

the jury. In closing argument, the prosecutor said, "[A]lthough she

Before the statement is made, ( 1) a recipient
pates eFidentiary use

ef the statement antici -

ef the statement, but does not ieform the declarant ef

this anticipation, and (2) the prosecution does not demonstrate that disclo sure

ef anticipation ef e1•identia1y use would hare substantia11y diminished

the probability that the declarant would hm•e made the statement.

The idea behind the second prong of such a test would be that
if disclosing the recipient's inYestigatory activity would not inhibit

is not here today to talk to you[,] she left someth(ng better. She
left you her testimony on the day that this happened .... [T]his
shows that the defendant, Adrian Da\·is, was at her home and
assaulted her."
Then the prosecutor played the 911 tape again. Here, the
statement has strong claim to be considered testimonial. Davis
and cases like it suggest that the 911 -call scenario should not
be dismissed by broad generalizations about the "typical" case.
Rather, a case -by-case assessment is necessary. Indeed, even if a

the declarant from making the statement, then the disclosure

911 call is nothing but an urgent plea for protection, the court

probably ought to be made; on the other hand, if the disclosure

should closely scrutinize it. I will repeat here the analysis that

would likely prevent the statement from being made, then the

Bridget McCormack (Law School Associate Dean for Clinical

inYestigator has sufficient reason for declining to make a disclo-

Affairs) and I have given:

sure. This rule seems to me to haYc some merit, but it may be too
complicated to be applied satisfactorily.

the fact of the call presumably should be admitted so the prosecution can present a coherent story about the incident. But even

2. Special cases
Many cases will arise, in a wide variety of circumstances,
in which it is a close question whether a statement should be
deemed testimonial. I will address here two of the most important

in that situation, the need to present a coherent story docs not
necessarily justify admitting the contents of the call. And even if
the circumstances do warrant allowing the prosecution to proYe
the contents of the call, those contents generally should not be

recurring types of cases.

admitted to prO\'C the truth of what they assert .... To the extent
that the contents of the call arc significant only as the caller's

a. When are 911 calls testimonial?
Consider first the example of statements made in calls to 911
operators. In recent years, courts ha\·e often admitted these statements - most characteristically, by complainants in domestic
Yiolence cases - even though the caller has not testified in
court. Under Crattford, this practice would not be allowed if the
statement is deemed "testimonial." The extent to which these calls
are "testimonial," howeYer, is an open question.
The court in one post -Cranford case (People

I'.

Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.

2d 875 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004)], in justifying its decision that statements in 911 calls should not be deemed testimonial, declared:
"Typically, a woman who calls 911 for help because she has
just been stabbed or shot is not contemplating being a 'witness' in
future legal proceedings; she is usually trying simply to saYc her
own life."
This generalization fits some cases, but not all. In some cases,
the caller does not percciYc that she is any longer in immediate
danger, and the primary purpose of the call is simply to initiate
investigative and prosecutorial machinery. Indeed, often the call
occurs a considerable time after the particular episode has closed,
and often the caller giYes a good deal of information that is not
necessary for immediate interYention. In a broader set of cases,
the caller's motiYes are mixed but she is fullv aware that what she
✓

says has potential eYidentiary value.

"To the extent the call itself is part of the incident being tried,

report of what has happened, such a report usually should be
considered testimonial."

b. When are statements by children "testimonial"?
Another t ype of case that frequently will test the limits of the
term "testimonial" inrnlvcs statements by children, typically
alleging some kind of abuse. Suppose, for example, a young child
t ells a police officer that an adult has physically or sexually abused
her. If an adult made such a statement, it would clearly be testi monial. But can a different result occur in the case of a Yery young
child?
At some point, the statement of a \·cry young child may
perhaps be considered more like the bark of a bloodhound than
like the testimony of an adult human; that is, the child may be
reacting to and communicating about what occurred, with no
sense of the consequences that her communication may have.
Arguably, fidelity to the text and policies of the Confrontation
Clause suggests that some degree of understanding of the conse
quences of the statement is necessary before a dcclarant may
be considered a "witness." If that is true, the better rule would
probably be that a person is not a witness unless she understands
that the statement, if accepted, is likely to lead to adverse consequences for the person accused. Under this view, a child could
be a witness eYen if she had no real understanding of the legal
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system; it would be enough to know that telling a police officer
about a bad thing that a person did would likely cause that person
to be punished .
In deciding whether a child is capable of acting as a "witness,"
the moral as well as cognitive development of the child may well
be material. My colleague [U-M Law School Professor] Sherman
Clark has argued that part of what drives the confrontation right
is not simply the formal categorization of a person as a "witness,"
but also the moral sense of the obligation of an accuser to confront
the accused . If he is right and I belieYe there is a good deal of
force to the argument - then the important question is not only
whether the child understands the punitiYe consequences of the
statement, but also "the JeyeJ of obligation and responsibility we
are willing to put on the shoulders of children."
EYen assuming a giYen child is capable of making a testimonial statement, the fact that the declarant is a child can complicate the question of whether the particular statement should be
deemed testimonial. As I suggested earlier, when an adult makes
a statement accusing a person of a crime, the statement should
be considered testimonial, CYcn though the statement is made to
a private indiYidual, if the dcclarant understands that the listener
will pass the information on to the authorities. But consider
children's st~tcments to intermediaries - for instance, a child's
statement to his mother. This situation may be materially different
from that of the adult witness, because C\'en a child sufficiently
mature to be capable of being considered a witness may have no
understanding that the third party will pass the statement on to
the authorities.
There are different ways to approach this problem . One ,·iew
is that the statement is not testimonial if a child in the position of
the declarant would not understand that the information would
reach the authorities. A second \'iew is that if the child, without
understanding the particulars, expects the mother to visit adverse
consequences upon the assailant, then the child should be deemed
to be testifying within his or her ability to do so. And a third Yicw
is that differentiating by maturity is simply inappropriate and
unadministrablc, so the perspective of a reasonable adult should
go,·crn determination of whether a statement is deemed testimonial.
Furthermore, the supplemental standard I have suggested as
a possibility in "im-itcd statement" contexts may be appropriate
in certain cases inYolYing statements by children. Under that
standard, the statement should be deemed testimonial (I) if the
inYestigati,·e nature of the conYcrsation is withheld from the child
but (2) it does not appear that the nondisclosure was necessary
to procure the statement. Again, the idea is that the inYcstigator
should not be allowed to withhold the purposes of her inquiries
gratuitously in an effort to defeat the confrontation right - but
the complexity of this inquiry gives me some qualms whether this
standard should be applied.
Plainly, this is an extraordinarily complex and difficult area,
and pending further guidance from the Court it will remain Yery
uncertain.
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3. What constitutes an ·opportunity for cross-examination"?
Under Cranford, the confrontation right presumptively is
violated if a statement is considered "testimonial" but the witness
does not testify at trial. By contrast, the confrontation right is not
violated where the witness is unavailable and the accused has had a
prior opportunity for cross-examination. In the wake of Cranford,
a wise prosecutor, aware of the possibility that a key witness may
be unaYailable, will often take the witness's deposition early in
the investigation. Cranford therefore raises an important question
about what constitutes an adequate "prior oRportunity for crossexamination ."
For example, suppose a laboratory report is a critical piece of
eYidencc. In most circumstances, the lab report should be considered testimonial, because the report is prepared in anticipation of
its introduction at trial. Therefore, the lab technician who made
the report should testify at trial if she is a\'ailablc to do so. If she
becomes unaYailablc through no fault of the accused (by accidental
death, for example), and the accused has not had an opportunity
to cross-examine her, then the report should not be considered
admissible.
But if the prosecution takes her deposition
that is, a pretrial
examination, subject to oath and cross-examination
and the
technician later becomes unavailable, the prosecutor may use the
deposition if the deposition presented an adequate opportunity
for cross-examination.
Because Crmiford increases the prosecutor's incentive to take a
deposition, we can expect pressure to amend the rules of criminal
procedure in jurisdictions, including at the federal level, in which
depositions arc not now readily available, and perhaps eYen to
allow depositions before charges have been brought. If a deposition is taken Ycry early, obYiously there will often be a question
whether it gaye the accused an adequate opportunity to crossexamine. Did counsel have enough time to prepare? Did counsel
know what issues to press, and ha,·c the information at hand that
would enable her to do so effectivcly?Thc better approach would
not be to assume that early opportunities arc inadequate per sc;
in many cases, counsel will ha,·e little difficulty, even with limited
preparation and nen before matters haYe proceeded very far,
determining what questions to ask. Rather, if the defendant had
an opportunity to cross-examine the witness at deposition but the
witness is unaYailable at trial, the confrontation right should not
require exclusion unless the defense shows some particular reason
to believe the opportunity was inadequate.
One more change in prosecutorial practice may well follow
from Cranford. Suppose a prosecutor announces an intention
to use a witness' statement and im·itcs the defense to demand
a deposition of the witness if it wants to be assured of crossexamining the witness. If the defendant docs not make the
demand, the witness is unavailable at trial, and the prosecution
offers the statement, would this procedure suffice to protect
adequately the "opportunity for confrontation"? Perhaps, by not
making the demand though being warned of the possible conse quences, the defendant would be deemed to have waived the
confrontation right. Or perhaps the procedure would be consid-

ered a violation of the accused's passive right to do nothing and
"be confronted with" the witnesses against him. We may ne\'er
know for sure unless the procedure is tried.

4. What constitutes "forfeiture"?
The idea that the accused cannot claim the confrontation right
if the accused's own misconduct prevents the witness from testifying at trial is a very old one. Cranford explicitly reaffirms it, and
justifiably so.
Forfeiture often raises difficult issues. If a witness is murdered
shortlv before she was scheduled to tcstifv against the accused
what :hawing of the accused's involveme~t docs the prosecu- '
tion ha\'e to make? Is it enough that the accused acquiesced in
the wrongdoing? And how is participation or acquiescence to be
determined; is the mere fact that the accused benefited from the
murder enough to raise a presumption that the accused acquiesced
in it?
One issue on which Cranford gi,·es little or no guidance may
be expected to become particularly pressing now. Suppose the
wrongful act that allegedly rendered the witness una\'ailable is the
same act with which he is charged . May the act nevertheless cause
a forfeiture of the confrontation right? For example, suppose the
accusation is of child sexual abuse and the prosecution argues
that the abuse itself has intimidated the child from testifying in
court (though she previously made a statement describing it). Or
suppose the accusation is of murder, the prosecution contending
that the accused struck a fatal blow and that the victim made a
statement identifying the accused and then died?
The first reaction of many observers is that in such situations
forfeiture would be bizarre. And yet, for reasons I will summarize
briefly, I belie,·e that in some circumstances it is appropriate.
In post-Cranford cases, two state supreme courts [Colorado and
Kansas] have agreed .
The objection most frequently made to applying forfeiture
doctrine in situations of this sort is that it is bootstrapping: The
accused is held to have forfeited the confrontation right on the
ground that he or she committed the very act on which the trial
centers - an act that he or she is accused of committing, but
denies committing and is presumed not to have committed. On
closer analysis, I do not believe the objection carries weight.
The situation is analogous to the one that often arises when a
defendant is accused of conspiracy and the prosecution argues that
the hearsay rule poses no bar to admission of a statement made by
a conspirator in support of the conspiracy. In each of these cases,
the same factual issue
the defendant's participation in the
conspiracy in the one case, and his commission of the wrongful
act that rendered the witness unavailable in the other - may
arise as a threshold matter for evidentiary purposes and when
determining guilt, but so what?The issue will likelv be decided for
the two different purposes by different fact-finder:
the judge
deciding threshold evidentiary matters and the jury determining
guilt
and on different factual bases .
Another objection is that presumably the crime was not
committed for the purpose of rendering the witness unavailable.
But again I respond with a shrug. The point of forfeiture doctrine

is that the accused has acted wrongfully in a way that is incom patible with maintenance of the right. Suppose that an informer
makes a statement to the police describing a drug kingpin's illegal
activities. But the informer stays undercover and, before the
kingpin knows anything about the statement, the two get into a
fight over a card game. The kingpin goes to a closet, pulls out a
gun, and murders the informer. If the kingpin is tried on drug
charges and the prosecution wants to introduce the informer's
statement, the kingpin should not succeed in arguing, "But I
haven't had a chance to cross-examine him."The appropriate
response is, "And whose fault is that?You murder~d him."
As interpreted in this way, forfeiture doctrine can solve one
of the puzzles of the confrontation right. The Cranford Court
accurately noted that the "dying declaration" exception is the only
exception commonly applicable to testimonial statements that
had been well established at the time of the Sixth Amendment's
adoption in 1791. The Court then said, with apparently studied
ambiguity, "If this exception must be accepted on historical
grounds, it is sui 9eneris." It seems highly unlikely that the Court
would generally exclude statements that fit within the dying
declaration exception, thus achie\'ing a remarkably unappealing
evidentiary result that courts have avoided for several hundred
years.
On the other hand, admitting these statements on the ground
suggested by the Court raises problems of its own. It obscures the
clarity of the principle adopted by Cranford, that if a statement is
testimonial it cannot be introduced against the accused unless he
had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. And it does so
on \'ery weak grounds, for (as noted abm·e) the rationale generally
cited for the dying declaration exception is absurd. A far better
resolution would be to recognize that, however the admissibility of dying declarations usually has been defended, it really is
best understood as a reflection of the principle that a defendant
who renders a witness unavailable by wrongful means cannot
complain about her absence at trial. That principle also explains,
incidentally, why ( 1) the hearsay exception for dying declarations
is limited to those that describe the cause of death, and (2) the
declaration will not be admitted unless death appeared imminent
at the time the declaration was made .

C. Crawfords impact on non-testimonial statements
If a statement is deemed not to be testimonial, what is the
impact of the Confrontation Clause? Cranford does not resolve the
matter. The theory of the opinion suggests, and the Court explicitly presen-es the possibility of, "an approach that exempted such
statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether." But,
in an apparent compromise, the Court also indicated that Roberts,
or some standard even more flexible, might also be applied in
this context. Numerous post-Cranford courts, having determined
the statements at issue were not testimonial, have gone through
the Roberts analysis and - not surprisingly - determined that
the statements were admissible. It is easy enough to see why a
court disposed to admit a statement would follow this approach:
If instead the court held that the Confrontation Clause did not
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apply at all to non-testimonial statements, it might leaYe itself
Yulnerable to reYersal if a higher court held that Roberts continues
to apply to such a statement. So it is prudent to run through the
Roberts analysis, which a court can always find is satisfied if it wants
to (that being one of the problems with Roberts.) No terrible harm
is done, perhaps, but the process is wasteful, because courts will
continue to run through it with predictable results. Until a pros ecutor is braYe enough to press the point, it is doubtful that there
will be a clear test in the Supreme Court on the proposition that
outside the context of testimonial statements, the Confrontation
Clause has no force.

Conclusion
Plainly, Cranford leaYcs open many Yery important questions.
In particular, the impact of the opinion may be Yery different
depending on whether the Supreme Court adopts a broad or
narrow understanding of the term "testimonial." But what is most
important is that the jurisprudence of the Confrontation Clause,
after a long detour, has been set on the proper course. This means
that the discourse can be rational and candid. Rather than manipulating unanswerable questions as to whether a given statement
is sufficiently "reliable" to warrant admission, the courts will be
asking whether admission ,·iolates the time honored and constitutionally protected right of a criminal defendant to insist witnesses
against him testify subject to cross-examination.
Even in the pages of this journal, I am willing to confess that I
am not a strict originalist in constitutional interpretation. I believe
that there arc some questions of constitutional law that cannot
be answered most usefully by asking what the public meaning
was of the constitutional text at the time it was adopted, or what
the intention of the Framers was. But in this context, all indica tions are in alignment. The historical background shows that the
meaning of the text and the intention of the Framers arc quite
clear, and the uncquirncal procedural rule on which they insisted
continues to resonate today as one of the central aspects of our
system of criminal procedure . The Cranford Court properly
said, "By replacing categorical constitutional guarantees with
open-ended balancing tests, we do violence to their design." The
Constitution does not always speak in terms of categorical guaran tees, but when it does, as in the case of the Confrontation Clause,
it should be heeded. Give credit to the Court for disenthralling
itself from a doctrine that had grown familiar but had no basis in
the Constitution and was utterly unsatisfactory, and for recognizing the essence of the confrontation right.
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